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Abstract  
This study investigates the impact of 306 strategic alliances on the increment of firm value in the 
case of China. I apply the event study methodology using OLS market model to examine the 
abnormal returns of sample firms. The results show that the announcements of strategic alliance 
in China generate significant positive average abnormal return on the announcement date (0.96%) 
which reaches 1% significance level, suggesting a sizable increment in firm value by the formation 
of strategic alliance.  
The findings referring to alliance-specific characteristics are as follows: The abnormal return for 
firms entering policy alliance with local governments is significantly higher than the average level 
of abnormal return of total alliances (1.60% for policy alliances compared with 0.96% for the 
overall alliances on the announcement date). More specifically, the higher one government is 
indexed in Chinese administrative ranking, the higher abnormal return its partnering firm can 
achieve. As for financing alliance, the results provide evidence that the abnormal return of private 
firms (1.02%) is much greater than the abnormal return of state-owned enterprises (0.25%). 
Furthermore, there are no significant differences for abnormal returns between domestic alliances 
and international alliances.  
On considering the impact of firm-specific characteristics, the results indicate that the firm value 
increment by strategic alliance announcements has an inverse relationship with firm size but does 
not show any correlation with firm’s growth opportunity. Contrast to the cases of firms in 
developed countries, the strategic alliances to low-tech companies contribute to increasing firm 
value more than the alliances to high-tech do (0.74% compared to 1.11% on the announcement 
date) in China. In addition, this study shows further evidence that for the firms involving alliances, 
the average abnormal return for private firms collaborating with state-owned partners reaches 
1.15%, which is significantly positive at 1% level. 
 
Keywords  Strategic alliance, Abnormal return, Firm value, Chinese characteristics 
  
 
i 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Motivation for the research ............................................................................................... 2 
1.2. Contribution of the study................................................................................................... 3 
1.3. Research scope and methodology ...................................................................................... 4 
1.4. Main findings .................................................................................................................... 4 
1.5. Study limitations ............................................................................................................... 5 
1.6. Structure of the study ........................................................................................................ 6 
2. Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1. Theoretical background ..................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.1. Theory related to resource-sharing ............................................................................. 7 
2.1.2. Costs in strategic alliances ......................................................................................... 9 
2.2. Chinese characteristics .................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.1. Importance of political connections in China............................................................ 12 
2.2.2. Credit constraint and financing distribution .............................................................. 13 
2.2.3. Current status for Chinese private firms ................................................................... 14 
2.3. Empirical Studies of strategic alliances ........................................................................... 14 
3. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................ 17 
3.1. The main hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 17 
3.2. Alliance-specific hypotheses ........................................................................................... 18 
3.2.1. Hypothesis for policy strategic alliance .................................................................... 18 
3.2.2. Hypothesis for financing strategic alliance ............................................................... 19 
3.2.3. Hypothesis for international strategic alliance .......................................................... 20 
3.3. Firm-specific hypotheses................................................................................................. 20 
3.3.2. Hypothesis related to private firm ............................................................................ 21 
  
 
ii 
 
3.3.3. Hypothesis for firm size ........................................................................................... 22 
3.3.4. Hypothesis for investment opportunity ..................................................................... 22 
4. Sample description ................................................................................................................. 24 
4.1. Screening process for target sample ................................................................................ 24 
4.2. Sample categorization ..................................................................................................... 26 
5. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 30 
5.1. Event study ..................................................................................................................... 30 
6. Empirical tests and results ...................................................................................................... 33 
6.1. Event study findings ....................................................................................................... 33 
6.2. Cross-sectional analysis .................................................................................................. 36 
6.3. Value impact upon different subgroups of announcement sample .................................... 42 
6.3.1. Further analysis for policy alliance ........................................................................... 43 
6.3.2. Role of private firms in strategic alliances ................................................................ 47 
7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 51 
8. References ............................................................................................................................. 52 
9. Appendixes ............................................................................................................................ 58 
Appendix A: Examples of strategic alliance ............................................................................... 58 
Strategic alliance for technology ............................................................................................ 58 
Strategic alliance for marketing .............................................................................................. 59 
Strategic alliance for both marketing and technology ............................................................. 60 
Strategic alliance for financing ............................................................................................... 62 
Strategic alliance with government ......................................................................................... 63 
Strategic alliance for infrastructure investment ....................................................................... 65 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................................... 67 
 
  
 
iii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Strategic alliances announcements by year ...................................................................... 26 
Table 2: Strategic alliance announcements by industry .................................................................. 27 
Table 3: Strategic alliance announcements by different alliance types ........................................... 29 
Table 4: Abnormal returns for different event windows ................................................................. 34 
Table 5: Description of variables used in the cross-sectional analysis ............................................ 38 
Table 6: Results for cross-sectional OlS regressions ...................................................................... 39 
Table 7: The correlation matrix for the variables ........................................................................... 41 
Table 8: The abnormal returns for subgroups of different strategic alliance types .......................... 44 
Table 9: Sub-categorization for policy alliances ............................................................................ 47 
Table 10: Sub-categorization for alliances with different ownership-holding structures ................. 49 
Table 11: Summary of the hypotheses and test results ................................................................... 50 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Nexus for Chinese Characteristics .................................................................................. 12 
Figure 2: Steps for screening process ............................................................................................ 25 
Figure 3: Abnormal returns for selected event period .................................................................... 35 
Figure 4: Abnormal returns for different subgroups of stratecgi alliances ...................................... 43 
Figure 5: Description for the structure of Chinese governments ..................................................... 45 
Figure 6: Proportion of strategic alliance by different ownership-holidng structures ...................... 48 
  
 
1 
 
1. Introduction  
Inter-firm alliances can bring independent firms together to share valuable resources in product 
design, technology development or marketing & distribution. Forming such alliances enables the 
enterprise to concentrate on its core competence while obtaining other skills or capabilities it lacks 
from market (Chan et al. 1997). In order to take advantage of potential growing opportunities, 
modern corporations undertake various actions, including growing internally, issuing licenses, 
forming strategic alliances, setting up new joint ventures, or acquiring minority interest from other 
firms. Compared with Mergers and Acquisitions or formations of joint venture, strategic alliance is 
a relatively flexible and easy operated approach for inter-firm collaboration to seize the growth 
opportunity (Marciukaiyte et al. 2009). Therefore, forging strategic alliances have been employed 
by more and more corporations in recent years.  
The concept of strategic alliance has been defined by many scholars in their studies. Brooke and 
Oliver (2005) suggest that the alliance is an agreement between parties formed to advance common 
interests or causes in an attempt to achieve a particular aim. From the perspective of the 
organizational nature, Gulati et al. (1998) define strategic alliance as a voluntary arrangement 
between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or 
services. Of all the definitions for strategic alliance, the one argued by Chiou and White (2005) is 
most widely cited. They state that: 
‘Strategic alliances are inter-corporate, cooperative agreements that lie in 
a continuum, with informal cooperative agreements (e.g., an implicit, non-
contractual agreement between a bank and an insurance company that they 
will refer customers to each other) at one end of the spectrum, and mergers 
and acquisitions at the other end of the spectrum, and many different forms 
between the two extremes.’  
 
There are many ways to categorize different types of strategic alliances. Contractor and Lorange 
(2002) divide the alliances into five types; technology transfer and improvement, licensing, 
franchising, joint research and development, joint ventures and marketing agreements. Chan et al. 
(1997) classify strategic alliances by their tactical purposes (e.g. licensing, marketing or distribution, 
development or research, technology transfer or system integration, combination of previous types 
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and not specified). According to the intent of the alliance, Lee et al. (2013) categorize the strategic 
alliances into resource alliance, technology alliance and marketing alliance. Based on these alliance 
classifications and Chinese circumstances, I categorize strategic alliances in the case of Chinese 
firms into six types such as marketing alliance, technology alliance, technology and marketing 
alliance, policy alliance and financing alliance. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the circumstances whether strategic alliances in China 
create value for shareholders of partnering listed firms. More particularly, I examine the importance 
of different factors associated with the characteristics of various types of firms and strategic 
alliances in determining the value creation across different partitioned alliance groups.  
1.1. Motivation for the research 
Given the increasing popularity trend of such inter-firm alliance phenomenon, there is an extensive 
literature dealing with the collaboration among enterprises. However, as the relevant alliance data is 
much easier to be acquired for equity-related collaboration, such as Mergers and Acquisitions 
(Campa and Hernando, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) and Joint Ventures (Koh and 
Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant and Schendel, 2000; Meschi and Cheng, 2002 and Gulati et al., 
2009), there is only a handful of studies dealing with the impact of strategic alliance announcement 
and firm value. Several scholars provide empirical evidence of the outcomes of strategic alliance 
focusing on the US market (Gleason et al., 2003, 2006; and Marciukaityte et al., 2009); Chiou and 
White (2005) study the evidence of Japanese financial firms; Bruce (2005) analyses the stock 
reaction using alliance announcement sample from UK; Followed by Lee et al. (2013), who use the 
data with Korea firms to unveil the firm value impact on strategic alliance announcement in 
developing countries. As far as I aware, there are no studies assessing firm value change for alliance 
announcement based on the Chinese stock market, possibly because of the unavailability of 
sufficient data. Given that, it would be very interesting to investigate the influence of strategic 
alliances on the increase of firm value in China, the largest developing economic entity over the 
world. As a country still at the initial stage of economic transition, the Chinese capital market is 
expected to present some unique characteristics different with those showed in mature markets in 
developed countries. Owing to the uniqueness of strategic alliances between Chinese firms, it would 
be valuable to explore which factors were more advantageous for firm value increment. 
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1.2. Contribution of the study 
Most of existing literature dealing with inter-firm collaboration concentrates on equity alliances (e.g. 
formation of joint ventures and mergers & acquisitions). There are only limited studies related to 
non-equity strategic alliances, most of which examine the announcement effects in the US stock 
market (Chan et al. 1997; Das et al. 1998). As far as I am aware, there is only one paper discussing 
the alliance announcements and their effects on firm value increase in developing country: Lee et al. 
(2003) study the effect of strategic alliance announcements based on the case of Korean firms. To 
bridge the gap of existing studies, this research is the first one to investigate whether declaring 
strategic alliances affect the firm value increment in China, the leading developing country of the 
world, in terms of the unique manual collected announcement sample of strategic alliance formation.  
Another significant contribution of this study is to set up & test a series of new hypotheses 
according to the unique characteristics showed in the Chinese capital market. By adding new 
classification for strategic alliances tailoring Chinese circumstance, it can be known which types of 
strategic alliances or factors are particularly advantageous in generating firm value in China. 
Compared with previous studies, this paper offers a novel perspective on considering the 
announcement impact of Chinese characteristics on firm value change. I conduct a three-dimension 
nexus to show the relationship of three most relevant Chinese characteristics (policy influence, 
private firm status and financing constraint) in analysing the influence of firm value increase. First, 
I take policy alliance, a unique alliance type in China referring to the collaboration between a listed 
firm and local government, into consideration. I find evidence that the abnormal returns for firms 
entering strategic alliances attributable to policy incentives are highest (1.60% at the announced 
date, compared to 0.96% which is the average level of total sample), implying a specific strong 
connection between the firm performance and political intervention. Second, due to the difficulty 
for Chinese private firms in acquiring loans from commercial banks, I conduct a unique comparable 
analysis for financing alliances to assess the firm performance between domestic enterprises and 
state-owned ones. Third, owing to the weak position of Chinese private firms in competing with 
state-owned enterprises, I propose a novel hypothesis from the perspective of ownership structure 
that the abnormal returns to private firms collaborating with state-owned firms are expected to be 
much higher than the rest. 
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1.3. Research scope and methodology 
This study mainly focuses on non-equity strategic alliance in the Chinese stock market. When 
collecting data, I used the announcement notices from Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, the only two stock exchanges in mainland China. As there are few alliance 
announcements disclosed to public before 2006 (less than ten announcements declared per year), 
the announcement sample in my study covers a time period from January 1
st
 2007 to December 31
st
 
2012. By screening all the strategic alliance announcements from the official websites of the two 
stock exchanges, I finally obtain 306 effective announcement samples related to my research 
interests. The methodology of event study introduced by MacKinlay (1997) is employed to acquire 
abnormal returns for individual listed firms. Based on the OLS market model commonly used in 
existing finance literature (Brown and Warner, 1985), I can obtain the average abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns for sample firms during the event window period. In addition, I 
conduct a cross-sectional analysis to identify the factors that affect the firm value increase by 
declaring the strategic announcements.  
1.4. Main findings 
I find that there exists a positive relationship between the announcements for strategic alliance and 
the firm value performances. Such finding is in line with many studies (Chan et al., 1997; Das et al., 
1998; Neill et al., 2001; Chiou and White, 2005; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009; Ho et al., 2010; 
Lee et al., 2013), which indicate that announcements for strategic alliance in the US, Japanese and 
Korean firms generate significant positive abnormal returns at the announcement dates. Also, the 
research shows that the average abnormal returns for the firms at two days before declaring the 
alliances are 0.18% and 0.21% respectively, indicating that there is some inside information leaked 
to public before the announced dates. This is consistent with that of Neill et al., (2001) and Lee et 
al., (2013).  
On considering the impact of alliance-specific characteristics on the effects of the alliances 
disclosure in the Chinese capital market, my findings strongly support that among all types of 
strategic alliances, alliances with local governments for political reasons yield the highest 
significant positive value, 1.60% at the announced date, for the partnering firms. Furthermore, 
different administrative rankings of partnering governments can affect the firm value increment as 
well. The higher one government is indexed in Chinese administrative ranking, the higher abnormal 
return its partnering firm can achieve: 3.00%, 1.90% and 1.25% for the governments in provincial 
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level, city level and county level, respectively. Within the subgroup of financing alliance, private 
firms receive larger abnormal returns than state-owned ones (1.02% compared to 0.25% on the 
announced day), suggesting their poor situation in acquiring loans from commercial banks. This 
result is consistent with that of Chiou and White (2005) that there exists little difference between 
the average abnormal return of domestic alliances, 0.89%, and international ones, 0.74%.  
The study also contains some interesting findings associated with firm-specific strategic alliances. 
From the ownership-holding perspective, the average abnormal return for private firms with state-
owned partnering firms is significantly positive, reaching 1.15% at 1% significance level, implying 
such alliances with state-owned enterprises are very important to private firms to change their weak 
competitive position. However, contrary to the conclusions by Chan et al. (1997), the abnormal 
return of Chinese high-tech companies (0.74%) is lower than the abnormal return of low-tech ones 
(1.11%). In addition, the study also indicates that firm size is significantly inversely correlated with 
the abnormal returns on the announced date, with negative coefficient         at 5% level. This 
result is in line with previous studies by Das et al. (1998), Chan et al. (1997), Chiou and White 
(2005) and Lee et al. (2013). But this study does not show any significant relationship between 
growth opportunity and firm value increment.  
1.5.  Study limitations 
Although this study unveils the relationship between the strategic alliance announcement and the 
value creation of Chinese listed firms as well as some important factors affecting wealth effect, 
there still exist several limitations. First, since there are less than ten strategic alliance activities 
yearly announced before 2007, sample span for sample announcement is limited to latest 6 years, 
from 2007 to 2012, which is relatively short compared with the time span used in most of previous 
studies. Second, some types of non-equity strategic alliance announcements are not considered in 
the study. For instance, I do not take the alliances with more than two partners involved into 
account. This can simplify the calculations for the subsequent data analysis, but will squeeze the 
sample size as well. Third, since some of Chinese strategic alliance announcements contain both 
technology and marketing clauses, it is difficult to simply categorize them into ‘technology alliance’ 
or ‘marketing alliance’.  So in this study, I do not conduct a comparative research to examine the 
firm performances between marketing alliances and technology alliances, which is usually 
discussed in other scholars’ studies (Chan et al, 1997; Lee et al., 2013). 
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1.6.  Structure of the study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a look at the theoretical 
background about the value creation and its contribution to the abnormal returns of individual firms. 
A description about Chinese characteristics and the empirical findings is also introduced in this 
chapter. Chapter four presents my hypotheses which are partitioned into three groups: main 
hypotheses, alliance-specific hypotheses and firm-specific hypotheses. Announcement sample for 
strategic alliance, data and methodology is described in chapter five. Findings are presented in the 
sixth chapter and chapter seven concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter presents a look at the fundamental literature related to my research problems. First, the 
theoretical background about why the abnormal returns can be expected from announcing strategic 
alliances is described in section 2.1. A series of studies provided in section 2.2 summarises some 
unique Chinese factors that might influence the wealth effect for strategic alliance announcements.  
Finally, an empirical research discussing the relationship between the abnormal return and firm 
value creation is present in section 2.3. 
2.1.  Theoretical background 
Why strategic alliance can add firm value? A lot of studies provide explanations on a theoretical 
basis. Generally speaking, these studies can be categorized from two perspectives: one is that 
forming strategic alliances can significantly reduce relative costs for partnering firms. Another one 
is from a resource-based perspective, suggesting that the rationale for the firm value increase by a 
strategic alliance is the potential synergy for the resources pooling by two alliance partners. 
2.1.1. Theory related to resource-sharing 
There is one obvious benefit for forging strategic alliance that widely recognized by previous 
studies: a firm entering strategic alliance can obtain access to strategic capabilities it desires by 
connecting to its alliance partner with such capabilities (mostly refer to the scare resources or 
competitive skills) or pooling its existing resources with the partner owning similar one (Nohira and 
Garcia-Pont, 2003). Such strategic alliance can create firms’ synergies by pooling valuable 
resources and also, enhance their competitive advantages. 
1) Knowledge sharing and integration 
The resources pooling by two strategic alliance partners can be various, most of which cannot be 
measured by economical method, especially for resources gathering related to market information 
sharing or political connection development. Such resources may create even greater firm value via 
knowledge sharing. According to theory called optimal knowledge application proposed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1991), forming a strategic alliance is a more cost-effective way than mergers and 
acquisitions in knowledge sharing. Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) also propose a knowledge 
accessing theory indicating that strategic alliances enhance the efficiency for knowledge application.  
  
 
8 
 
However, sometimes cost for knowledge transfer might be very high, especially when the mutual-
development for new product or innovative technology are involved in alliance projects, since such 
strategic alliances always require specific know-how or involve information that is completely 
sensitive. Consequently, these types of strategic alliances are expected to provide greater value 
increment for the partners involved in the alliance than those who do not contain the specific know-
how or sensitive important information (Chan et al. 1997).  
From the perspective of knowledge-based theory, Chen and Chen (2003) propose a ‘learning effect’ 
argument as one of the reasons for firms to build alliance relationships. Some resources pooled by 
inter-firm collaboration can be readily employed without extra learning process (e.g. marketing 
information or outsourcing distributions). However, some other resources, especially technology-
related ones, still need extensive learning before using them. Take the knowledge transfer for 
technology as an example. Under technology strategic alliance, some technologies are readily 
applicable via licensing or outsourcing after reaching the alliance agreement by partnering firms. 
But others might be useless unless partnering firms take extra effort to learn through their own 
research. Therefore, learning effect is very important for cooperative partners in the strategic 
alliance. 
2) Resource dependence 
According to resource-based theory, an important incentive for partnering firms entering strategic 
alliances is to seek valuable resources they lack (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  Although such 
collaborations are mutually dependent by firm partners, there exist asymmetries between the two 
parties: one firm might be more dependent on a certain strategic alliance than the other. For instance, 
small start-up companies might be sought out as strategic alliance partners due to their access to 
specific technology know-how and strong research capabilities. Many scholars (e.g. Das et al., 1998; 
Lee et al. 2013) find evidence that small size companies have more bargaining power in strategic 
alliance activities than big ones, since larger companies like to find small companies as the 
cooperative partner for their specific technological know-how. 
Another typical example for resource dependence theory is private firms aligning with state-owned 
firms in the Chinese capital market. Private enterprises are always more dependent on the alliance 
with state-owned enterprises because of their governmental background and preferential right for 
financing from state-owned commercial banks (Lee et al. 2013).  
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2.1.2. Costs in strategic alliances 
Apart from the resource-based theoretical framework, the benefits associated with cost reduction for 
the firms entering strategic alliances are also widely assessed by many studies. Of all costs related 
to strategic alliance activities, transaction cost, agency cost and cost of opportunistic behaviour are 
discussed most often by previous literature. 
1) Transaction cost 
Transaction cost theory, an economic approach to organizational entity, aims to uncover the 
rationale why structures of institutions are more efficient to govern the economic activities than 
markets do. Some literature (Pisano, 1990; Chen and Chen, 2003) emphasizes the importance of the 
structural elements within the strategic alliance (e.g. market imperfection and the control 
mechanism). Market imperfection indicates that acquiring desired resources from the market might 
be inefficient compared with resource-sharing alliance among partners, while control mechanism 
implies an alternative way to allocate resources within the cooperative firms entering an alliance. In 
principle, market is more efficient governance scheme for resource allocation than that for hierarchy 
institutional structure of individual firms. However, under some special circumstances, forging a 
strategic alliance, a hybrid approach compromising of both market and internal structure within the 
firm, occurs as an efficient way to acquire resources. 
One alliance closely associated with transaction cost theory is the strategic alliance activity to 
partnering firms from high-tech industry. Inter-firm alliances with high-tech firms are likely to have 
relatively high technology uncertainty (refers to a high probability of unexpected technological 
changes), which elevates the transaction costs via excessive supervising, monitoring and regulating 
by market mechanisms (Chen and Chen, 2003). Chan et al. (1997) also suggest that a particularly 
high transfer cost for the strategic alliances with high-tech development or other innovative 
endeavours requiring explicit knowledge-intensive know-how. In technological alliance activities, 
partnering firms are more concerned about the control of their propriety for knowledge or skills. 
Consequently, instead of purchasing technology from market, partnering firms are more likely to 
choose hierarchical forms of governance (Williamson, 1985; Walker and Weber, 1984).  
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2) Agency cost 
Strategic alliances can add value to a firm by improving its organizational flexibility. Such 
flexibility can help the partnering firms deal with the changing demand from the marketplace more 
effectively (Chan et al. 1997). Since forging strategic alliance do not create a new integrated 
organizational entity, forming strategic alliance can dramatically minimize the agency costs for 
partnering firms. Under the inter-firm collaboration, there always exists an agency cost that the 
management for the partnering firms are reluctant to release their resources control, but the strategic 
alliance can avoid such costs (Chan et al. 1997). Jensen (1986a, b) also suggests that in joint 
venture enterprises or an integrated firms, all of profits generated from cooperative activities are 
directly associated with the firms involved in the collaboration and do not sink under the 
management’s discretionary control. So such agency problem is not likely to arise between the 
firms under a strategic alliance.  
3) Costs for opportunistic behaviour 
In addition to transaction cost or agency cost, there are some additional costs related to 
opportunistic behaviour in network organizations (Klein et al., 1978; Kranton, 1996). Inherently 
speaking, strategic alliance is an incomplete agreement as the alliance partners can never foresee the 
possible prospects of their collaboration when two partnering firms reach the agreement. This 
flexibility in the cooperative activity might cause some problems related to property rights or future 
profit allocation that are not well defined, hence opportunistic behaviour rises in such case (Das et 
al., 1998). Such costs are inevitable when the alliance partnering firms search reliable cooperative 
firms, design collaboration contracts as well as extra boning clauses, and monitor the behaviour of 
partner firms (Chan et al. 1997).   
Several studies discuss the mechanism to deter partnering firms’ opportunistic behaviour to inter-
firm alliance. Parkhe (1993) suggests that one possible way to minimize the negative effect is via a 
commitment of non-recoverable assets (e.g. advanced technology, specific physical assets which 
have limited use outside the cooperative activity). Such commitment for non-recoverable assets 
serves as a pledge against defection for partnering firms, which could effectively reduce the costs 
generated by opportunistic behaviour. He also comes up with a hypothesis that the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour can be reduced if the partnering firms saw the potential of their cooperative 
activity beyond the scope of current agreement they reach. However, such hypothesis, as he notes, 
is very difficult to test in reality. 
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2.2.  Chinese characteristics 
China is one of the fastest growing economic entities around the world, but neither its legal system 
nor the financial mechanism is maturely developed. Although Chinese private sector has 
tremendously developed since 1978, when the national people’s congress firstly recognised the 
legal status of private property
1
, it still suffers from both political and economic discrimination 
(Young 1995). From this perspective, there are several studies concentrating on the performance of 
Chinese private firms by building a Law (policy) – finance – growth nexus. Li et al. (2008) study 
the operation of private firms and its affiliation with policy connection (mainly refers to the 
Communist Party of China). They find that enterprises with identity of Party membership are much 
easier to obtain loans from state-owned commercial banks and perform more confidently within the 
Chinese legal system. Also, they show further evidence that party membership of the enterprise has 
a closer relationship with firm performance in regions with weaker legal protection. Allen et al. 
(2005) divide the Chinese enterprises into three sectors (state sector, listed sector and private sector). 
They suggest that diversified financing distributions and governance mechanisms are the principal 
internal motivations for the value growth of private sector.  
Built on previous studies, I propose a policy – finance – private firm nexus to analyse how such 
three factors influence the enterprises’ performance. These three factors are also expected to play an 
important role on firm value creation by the strategic alliance announcements. Further detailed 
analyses are provided in the subsequent chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 In 1978, National People's Congress approved a constitutional amendment to protect private property rights, 
marking the first time in PRC history that the legal status of private property was officially endorsed by the Party (Li et 
al., 2008). 
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Figure 1: Nexus for Chinese Characteristics 
 
Figure 1 provides a three-dimension nexus for the three most representative characteristics related 
to the impact of strategic alliance announcement on firm value growth in China. 
2.2.1. Importance of political connections in China 
It is acknowledged by more and more scholars that political connections can bring value to 
enterprises. By analysing firms’ performance in Indonesia, Fisman (2001) concludes that a large 
proportion of the value of well-connected Indonesian firms is derived from political connections. 
Faccio (2006) provides a comprehensive glimpse at political connection of enterprises over the 
world. In the study, he sets a new way to define firms’ political connection: whether one of the 
firm’s large shareholders or top manager is minister, parliament member or has a close relationship 
with party or top politician. He finds that political connections are more common in the countries 
with high level of corruption, with severe restriction upon foreign investments and with high 
transparency.  
There has also been a growing amount of economic literature aiming at uncovering the relationship 
between the political connection and firm value. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) indicate that building 
political connection may secure the firm with favourable policy conditions.  Fan et al. (2007) study 
the CEOs’ political background and suggest that firms led by CEO with political connection are 
more likely to accept other bureaucrats involved in the decision-making of firm’s operation. Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) find such connection grants firm the valuable resources, especially for the loans 
Firm's value 
growth 
Status of 
private firms 
Policy 
influence 
Financing 
incentives 
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from commercial banks. As for China, the largest transition economic entity, it is even more 
important for the enterprises to seek policy support from local governments since they control most 
of fundamental resources Li et al. (2008), such as land and taxation, which are indispensable for 
their business expansions. 
According to the circumstance of the Chinese capital market, there is also a specific strategic 
alliance type that is commonly seen among listed companies in China – building a strategic alliance 
relationship with local government. On one hand, in order to penetrate into an unfamiliar market, 
the firms need support from local governments. On the other hand, local governments are very 
welcome to introduce new enterprises into their administrative region in order to boost the local 
economic growth. Up till now, the scale of local GDP is still regarded as one of the most important 
criteria to measure the performance of governments. 
2.2.2. Credit constraint and financing distribution 
Traditionally regarded as the substitute for state-owned enterprises, Chinese commercial banks have 
played an increasing important role on financing support for both state-owned enterprises and 
private enterprises, especially after the Chinese economic transition from the socialist planned 
economy. Allen et al. (2005) suggest that the two most crucial financing sources for Chinese 
enterprises are bank loans and self-fundraising, and the loans provided by commercial banks 
account for a sizable fraction of enterprises’ financing needs. By studying the constraint factors for 
the enterprise’s development, Stein (2003) finds evidence that financial constraints are a significant 
obstacle for the firm growth. This situation is especially prevalent in China, in which the firms treat 
the access to financial markets as a key determinant for the enterprise’s development (Héricourt and 
Ponect, 2009). 
In current stage, there still exists significant market imperfection in China. According to Chinese 
regulation, the largest commercial banks, most of which were predominantly state-owned banks, 
were not allowed to lend money to private firms for a long time. Before 1998, the four largest state-
owned commercial banks (Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of China, China Construction Bank 
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) were only permitted to provide loans to the 
enterprises which are state-owned (Héricourt and Ponect, 2009). Although such “political pecking 
order” policy has been cancelled since 1998, it is not easy for private firms to obtain funding from 
the banks compared with the enterprises owned by the state. Such credit discrimination for private 
firms causes many problems, such as impeding the firm growth or, even worse, delaying the whole 
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economic growth (Huang, 2003). Farrell and Lund (2006) provide evidence that, regardless of the 
fact that the private companies produce more than half of the total GDF of the country, they only 
obtain less than 30% of loans from society. What is worse, it is very difficult for them to acquire 
financial support from the Chinese corporate bond market as well. Using a three-year data based on 
city-level, Wei and Wang (1997) find relatively clear evidence that China’s bank loans favour state-
owned industrial enterprises more than private ones. They come up with further suggestions that 
reform for the banking loan sector, especially for its lending policy, should be employed as early as 
possible. 
2.2.3. Current status for Chinese private firms 
Nowadays, Chinese economic growth is mainly led by state-owned enterprises. They have stronger 
financial support and wider political connections than private firms do. In spited of the rapid 
development of private firms since 1978, the year that legal status of private property was 
recognised by the Communist Party, the political and economic discrimination for the private 
enterprises still exist to some extent (Li et al., 2008). According to some ideological reasons, 
private corporations were still treated as an inferior form of ownership (compared with ownership 
of state-owned corporations) even till 1990s, not to mention a serious of movements against 
‘inappropriate’ ownership of private firms in 1980s (Li et al., 2008). Also, as the government still 
controls most of fundamental resources (e.g. land, capital, taxation) that dominate the firm growth, 
private firms are always in a relatively weak position when competing with state-owned firms 
which always have more diversified distributions for acquiring resources they lack. Because of this, 
Héricourt and Ponect (2009) suggest that developing cross-border relationship with enterprises 
abroad might be a viable approach to overcome legal and financial obstacles they have in local 
regions.  
2.3.  Empirical Studies of strategic alliances 
A substantial amount of empirical research focuses on analysing the announcement impact upon 
equity-related announcements, most of which are joint venture formation based on US market. 
After analysing the firms in US, McConnell and Nantell (1985) find evidence that equity-alliance 
announcements of the US firms generate significant positive abnormal return on the announcement 
day. Followed by their study, Koh and Venkatraman (1991) test stock performance by the influence 
upon the joint venture announcements based on a particular industry (information technology 
sector). Their finding is consistent with that by McConnell and Nantell (1985), suggesting that the 
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announcement of joint venture collaboration contributes to a significant increase of the firm value. 
Based on that, they further categorize the joint venture sample into two groups: one for the partners 
in the same industry and one in different. They find evidence that horizontal joint ventures (alliance 
partners in the same industry) have more wealth effect than none-horizontal joint ventures (alliance 
partners in different industries). By contrast, Mohanram and Nanda (1998) show evidence that 
alliance partners in the same industry have a negative impact upon the firm value. In sum, most 
scholars find a positive market reaction by declaring the joint venture formation. However, there are 
also few cases showing the opposite. For instance, both Lee et al. (2013) and Wyatt (1990) and 
Chung et al. (1993) find evidences that the formation of joint ventures negatively affect the value 
creation of US corporations.  
As for the announcement impact of non-equity strategic alliance upon the firm value, two groups of 
scholars in particular, Chan et al. (1997) and Das et al. (1998) conduct representative analyses 
based on the US market. They suggest that, similar with the case of joint venture formations, non-
equity strategic alliances significantly increase the firm value on the announcement date as well. In 
addition, consistent with the findings by McConnell and Nantell (1985) dealing with the joint 
venture case, the abnormal return yielded by horizontal strategic alliances (firms in the same 
industry) is much higher than the abnormal return by non-horizontal strategic alliances. Also, Chan 
et al. (1997) further unveil the intrinsic incentives behind the larger value creation from horizontal 
alliances, suggesting that the huge value increase is tightly associated with either pooling latest 
skills or technology or strengthening the market position of the firm. In a similar vein, the study of 
Das et al. (1998) also suggest that technology resources are much more important than marketing 
ones for the same industry. In addition, probably due to the stronger bargaining power small firms 
have in strategic alliance activities, the abnormal returns of them are much higher than the abnormal 
returns of larger enterprises. 
Very recently, more and more scholars draw their academic attention to the wealth effect of 
strategic alliance announcements, although most of them still focus on the firms in the US capital 
market. By analysing the value increment effect of 89 non-equity strategic alliances from the 
information and technology sector in the US, Neill et al. (2001) argue that the alliance 
announcements yield a positive abnormal returns for firm partners on the announcement date. They 
also show evidence that there exists the announcements information leakage for a certain period 
before the announced date. From the perspective of characteristics of strategic alliances, 
Swaminathan and Moorman (2009) and Ho et al. (2010) only focus on the firms declaring 
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marketing alliances in the US market and find a positive correlation between firm value and alliance 
announcement.  
There are also some scholars who show particular interests in analysing the alliance announcements 
impact upon the firm performances in the financial services industry. By analysing the 
announcements sample for financial institutions in Japan, Chiou and White (2005) suggest that the 
strategic alliance announcements contribute to a positive increase for the firm value in Japanese 
financial services industry. Gleason et al. (2003) analyse the market performances of US financial 
services firms by dividing them into different industry subgroups (banking, investment services and 
insurance) and into separate holding periods (6, 12 and 18 months after the announcement).  They 
find that firms participating in strategic alliance enjoy positive significant abnormal returns due to 
the alliance announcements. Marciukaityte et al. (2009) find similar evidence that the market reacts 
positively to the strategic alliance announcements. More interestingly, they also suggest that the 
market has a more favourable reaction to the announcements by the financial services firms that are 
finally acquired by their alliance partners afterwards. Amici et al. (2012) specifically focus on the 
market impact of banking firms in Europe and the US on both strategic alliance and joint venture. In 
addition to the result of a positive correlation between the announcements and firm value, they also 
suggest that joint ventures generate more value when there are non-banking financial partners 
involved in the case.  
As for the strategic alliance in developing countries, only one article refers to the case. Lee et al. 
(2013) examine the impact of strategic alliance upon the value increase of firms based on the case 
of Korea. In consistent with the situation in developed countries, strategic announcements of 
Korean firms yield significant positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. Also, by 
considering the partner firms’ location and alliances’ characteristics, they further show evidence 
that the marketing alliances with firms particularly from the most advanced G7 countries contribute 
to a significantly larger increase of firm value.  
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3. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses presented in this chapter are mainly derived from literatures reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The hypotheses are divided into main hypotheses and characteristic hypotheses. Main hypotheses 
aim to unveil the announcement impact on the value creation for the listed firms in China. After that, 
I further categorize the characteristic hypotheses into two subgroups: one refers to hypotheses 
related to alliance-specific characteristics in order to test which alliance factors have significant 
impact on firm value increase; another one is for firm characteristics related hypotheses so that we 
can know how these characteristics are expected to affect the observed results. 
3.1. The main hypotheses 
From the perspective of corporate governance, the strategic alliance, a bilateral collaboration 
between the partner firms, is a win-win structurally arrangement that can significantly reduce the 
cost related to negotiating, coordinating, and supervising the inter-firm transactions. Kogut (1988) 
and Jarillo (1989) find evidence that instead of short-term cost-effective benefits, firms enter the 
strategic alliance mainly to seek long-term strategic advantages, which should be recognized by the 
efficient market. Consequently, there should be a positive market reaction to the strategic alliance 
announcements and positive abnormal returns around the announcement date (Das et al., 1998).   
Although the empirical evidences concerning the value effect of the strategic alliance 
announcements are varied in different regions, most literature proves a positive correlation between 
the announcement of a strategic alliance and firm value. Some studies (Neill el al., 2001; Lee el al., 
2013) find further evidence that some information about the strategic alliance leaks to public before 
the announcement date (usually one or two days before). In terms of this, I propose the main 
research hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns 
attributable to alliance announcements on the announcement date are 
significantly positive. 
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Hypothesis 1b: For firms entering strategic alliances, the cumulative 
abnormal returns attributable to alliance announcements on the 
announcement date and one day before are higher than the abnormal 
returns on the announcement date. 
 
3.2. Alliance-specific hypotheses 
The above hypotheses aim to test the overall value effect for the strategic alliance announcements. 
However, according to previous studies as well as the unique economic and political environment in 
China, some certain types of strategic alliance announcements are expected to have the most 
important impact upon the value creation for the listed firms. Here I propose three relevant 
hypotheses to test the wealth effects by certain types of strategic alliance. 
3.2.1. Hypothesis for policy strategic alliance 
Li et al. (2008) emphasise the importance to develop the political relationship for firm’s business 
development, especially in the countries like China, of which the legal environment has not been 
well-cultivated to guarantee the fair competition. Using identity of party membership in the 
corporations to measure the political connections, they find evidence that governmental support can 
help firms obtain resources and behave confidently. Consequently, for enterprises reaching strategic 
alliance agreement with government, the value increase is expected to be significantly positive. 
Also, the administrative rankings of different governments and the incentives for firms to build such 
political alliances might have an impact on firm value creation as well. Therefore, I come up with 
the first alliance-specific hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Abnormal return attributable to strategic alliance 
announcements with local governments are greater than abnormal returns 
attributable to other alliances. 
Hypothesis 2b: The higher one government is indexed in Chinese 
administrative ranking, the higher abnormal return its partnering firm can 
achieve  
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Hypothesis 2c: For firms entering policy strategic alliances, the abnormal 
returns to industry related firms are higher than abnormal returns to non-
industry related ones 
 
3.2.2. Hypothesis for financing strategic alliance 
Ruan and Xiang (2013) study the determinants for banking loan built on the evidence from Chinese 
listed firms from 1996 to 2009.  Since the regulation preventing Chinese state-owned commercial 
banks from lending to private companies was abandoned in 1998, the competition has raised 
between state-owned and private companies in acquiring banking loans. The empirical result shows 
that state-owned companies and private companies have different channels to obtain loans. State-
controlled firms can easily acquire loans from state-owned policy banks and commercial banks, 
while private firms mainly depend on the financing support from foreign banks. According to this, 
it is reasonable to assume positive abnormal returns for listed firms declaring strategic alliances 
with banks for financing reasons. 
The Chinese financial system is severely distorted by governmental regulation for a long time 
(Allen et al, 2005; Li et al. 2008). Despite many healthy privately-controlled firms can operate 
much more efficient than state-owned ones do, it is very difficult for private corporations to get 
access to external financing support (Héricourt and Ponect, 2009). Based on this, I expect that when 
private firms choose to align with commercial banks, their market reactions will be more positive 
than those of firms controlled by the state.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns 
attributable to financing alliances are greater than the abnormal returns 
attributable to other alliances. 
Hypothesis 3b: For firms entering financing alliances, abnormal returns to 
private firms are greater than abnormal returns to state-owned firms. 
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3.2.3. Hypothesis for international strategic alliance 
Following by previous studies (Chiou and White 2005, Amici et al., 2012), it is also expected that 
the strategic alliances with foreign partners involved have a greater impact on the increment of firm 
value than those for domestic firms. Gleason et al. (2003) suggest that strategic alliance with 
foreign partners is always treated as a viable strategy for internationalization, especially when the 
firms do not have enough experience or resources to lead the growth. Apart from the resource 
incentives, other constraints, such as local regulation, need to be taken into account as well. As 
domestic financial constraint plays a very important role in restricting firms’ development, 
promoting cross-border relationships with foreign firms can help domestic firms overcome both the 
financial and legal obstacles in investing abroad. As such, I formulate a hypothesis that is similar to 
the conclusion made by Amici et al. (2012) that international alliances outperform domestic ones, 
as the firms value the opportunity to new market penetration more.  
 
Hypothesis 4: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns to 
the firms with foreign partners are greater than abnormal returns to the 
firms with domestic ones.  
 
3.3. Firm-specific hypotheses 
In addition to the alliance-specific hypotheses, some firm-level variables are also involved in the 
study. Such control variables include the firm size, investment opportunity, subgroup for private 
firm entering alliance, and the firm group in high-tech industry.  
3.3.1. Hypothesis for high-tech enterprises 
By observing the Chinese stock market for the latest tens of years, I find that the high-tech 
companies, most of which are knowledge-intensive corporations, have remarkable performances 
than those who are not. As forming strategic alliance activities is regarded as an effective mutual 
learning process, high-tech companies gain more knowledge resources than low-tech companies do 
(Morrey et al., 1996). Also, in the high tech industry, most of the firms sign strategic alliance 
agreements regarding to product development and technology transfer. The study by Schakenraad 
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and Hagedoorn (1994) shows that firms entering technological and R&D alliances have much more 
profits than the firms entering the alliances in other fields. Furthermore, as the valuation of high-
tech firms is very complicated and costly, the investors always pay more attention to the favourable 
disclosed information of listed firms, and the announcement of strategic alliance is one of the 
prominent examples. The high-tech companies should get higher abnormal returns than low-tech 
companies do. Therefore, I present the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns to 
high-tech enterprises are greater than abnormal returns to low-tech 
enterprises.  
 
3.3.2. Hypothesis related to private firm 
Preceding chapter describes how Chinese private enterprises suffer from the unfair treatment 
politically and economically. In principle, many listed company groups are headed by holding 
companies which are usually controlled or majority-owned by state-controlled enterprises (named 
by governmental asset management company or investment company, etc.). Compared with private 
enterprises, state-owned enterprises always enjoy more preferential status both in acquiring banking 
loans and other possible policy conveniences.  
The total company sample is divided into two subgroups, one for private enterprises aligning with 
state-owned enterprises, and the other for the rest. If a private firm signs a strategic alliance 
agreement with a state-owned partner, it will be interpreted by investors that the private firms 
cannot only obtain the technology or capital support from the state-owned enterprises, but also the 
invisible political connections behind them.  So I present the sixth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns to 
private firms with state-owned cooperative partners are greater than the 
rest. 
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3.3.3. Hypothesis for firm size 
Numerous studies show that the size of the listed firms is also an important factor to influence the 
abnormal return by declaring the alliance (Das et al, 1998). Although the target sample group of 
previous studies is different from the sample used in my study (equity alliance rather than non-
equity strategic alliance), this hypothesis might hold as well. As larger firms like to seek out smaller 
and innovative firms for their unique technological competences, the relative bargaining power of 
the small firm in a strategic alliance will be significantly higher than that of the large partner 
(McConnell and Nantell, 1985, Das et al., 1998).   
Teece (1992) believes that small companies have more flexibility. Compared with large 
bureaucratic corporations, small firms can acquire benefit much easier due to their high operative 
efficiency. Chan et al. (1997) also indicate that forming strategic alliances can increase firm value 
through enhanced organizational flexibility. These arguments, along with the opinions associated 
with resource dependence theory proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), indicate that larger firms 
might be more dependent on strategic alliances than the small. So for this hypothesis, I propose 
differential abnormal return expectations between the large and small partners entering strategic 
alliances:  
 
Hypothesis 7: The size of firms entering strategic alliances is negatively 
correlated with abnormal returns attributable to alliance announcements. 
 
3.3.4. Hypothesis related to investment opportunity 
Brook and Oliver (2005) indicate that an enterprise with good investment opportunities is the 
enterprise with positive net present value (NPV) available. In order to measure the investment 
opportunity of sample firms, the financial ratio of stock price to book value (PTBV) of the firm is 
employed by previous literature (Brook and Oliver, 2005; Lee et al 2013), suggesting a positive 
correlation between the ratio and firm value. Firms with high stock price to book value ratio are 
regarded as growth firms, which mean they have access to positive net present value (NPV) or good 
growth opportunities. However, by analysing the firm’s performance in the US market, Das et al. 
(1998) suggest that there exists a negative relationship between the growth opportunity and the 
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value change. As for this study, the ratio of stock price to book value (PTBV) is conducted to 
measure whether the firms involved in strategic alliances have positive value changes.  
 
Hypothesis 8: The growth opportunity of firms entering strategic alliances 
is positively correlated with abnormal returns attributable to alliance 
announcements. 
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4. Sample description 
Sample description contains two parts: first I describe a general profile about the approach to obtain 
the target sample by a certain filter process. Then a comprehensive profile of the sample 
announcement is provided: I categorize the strategic announcements according to different years, 
different firm industries, and different alliance types.  
4.1. Screening process for target sample 
The data collection period can be divided into two phases. The first phase is to summarise an 
announcement list for strategic alliances. In order to get enough announcements in the Chinese 
stock market, I review all the announcements published both on the official website of Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the only two stock exchanges in mainland China, 
and finally obtain 306 strategic announcements by listed firms from 2007 to 2012
2
.  Here is the 
specific approach that I used to acquire the sample announcements:  
First, from the websites of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, it is possible 
to find all the public announcements disclosed by listed companies. Then screening by the key 
words “strategic alliance” and ‘strategic cooperation’3, I can acquire all the related strategic alliance 
announcements during the sample period. After that, by using specific filtering process of the initial 
sample group, some announcements that are not directly related to my research interest are 
excluded. At last, a summary for a company list of all the announcements that I need is available. 
The filter criteria (the announcements that are not considered in this study) for the announcements 
are as follows: 
 Equity strategic alliances, such as forming a joint venture, increasing capital and regrouping, 
for the target samples in this research are non-equity strategic alliance announcements 
 The strategic alliance announcements that are not complying with the standardized format or 
structure of listed company announcements. E.g. missing important information about what 
kind of alliance it is or how they make the alliance 
                                                             
2 Before 2007 there is only few strategic announcements published on the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, indicating that such type of collaboration was not widely recognised among listed 
companies in China. 
3
 As the announcements are all published in Chinese, the key words inputting the searching engine of the website also 
need to be Chinese. In Chinese, there is little difference between ‘Strategic Alliance’ and ‘Strategic Cooperation’. 
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 One strategic alliance announcement with more than two relevant parties. E.g. a listed firm 
reaches a strategic alliance announcement with two different companies, respectively  
 One listed firm signing more than one strategic alliance announcements in one day just 
counted once 
 The listed firms in strategic alliance announcements with missing necessary accounting data 
during the sample period 
 The strategic alliance agreement is not the initial one. E.g. supplementary agreement for the 
strategic alliance announcement, progress announcement 
Also, I put some special types of the announcements into the sample group:   
 The participant parties in the strategic alliance include the parent or subsidiary of a listed 
firm. E.g. A announced that B, the subsidiary of A, signed a strategic alliance agreement with 
C 
 Some announcements stated that the strategic alliance agreement has not officially signed yet, 
e.g. letter of intent for the strategic alliance, since such alliance intentions have similar 
market reactions as strategic alliances do 
Figure 2: Steps for screening process 
 
Step 1 
• Oringinal sources: Official website of Shanghai Stock Exahnge and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
• Column: Announcements of listed firms 
Step 2 
• Define the sample period 
• Key words: 'Strategic Alliance' and 'Strategic Cooperaiton' 
Step 3 
• Filter the announcements by certain criteria 
• Consider the special types of announcements 
Step 4 
• Obtain the target sample of strategic alliance announcements 
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4.2. Sample categorization 
Table 1: Strategic alliances by year 
Panel A: Strategic alliance announcements by year 
Year of announcement Number of announcements Percentage of total 
2007 12 3.92 % 
2008 15 4.90 % 
2009 42 13.73 % 
2010 62 20.26 % 
2011 65 21.24 % 
2012 110 35.95 % 
Total 306 100% 
Panel B: Some key indexes of sample firms 
Mean ROE 0.141 
Mean size (USD) 43552494  
Mean P/B ratio 4.138 
Mean listed time (year) 7.55 
Table 1 describes s the time distribution of 306 strategic alliances and some basic indexes of sample 
firms entering strategic alliance announcements. 
Table 1 shows the total sample of strategic alliance announcement from Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2012 and the selected indexes of the firms. More 
specifically, Panel A describes the total sample of strategic alliance announcements classified into 
years. From the panel we can clearly see a significant growing trend for the number of strategic 
alliance announcements by years (there are only 12 non-equity strategic alliances 6 years ago while 
in 2012 the amount increased to 110, indicating such type of inter-firm collaboration, strategic 
alliance, has been more and more prevalent among the listed firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange). From the indexes in Panel B, we can have some basic understandings 
for firms involved in strategic alliances listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. The ratio of ROE and P/B are used to measure firms’ probabilities and growth 
opportunities, respectively. The assets of listed firms at the year-end before the announcement year 
are conducted to value their average economic scale. Furthermore, the Mean listed time from the 
date of IPO to the announced date is employed to assess the average listed time of the individual 
firms. 
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Classification by industry is showed on Table 2.  The types of the industry group are followed by 
categorization from DataStream database. According to OECD Classification Scheme described in 
Appendix B, the industry groups are partitioned into two based on whether the companies are 
technology-based or not (one is High-technology & Medium-high-technology industries and the 
other is Medium-low-technology & low-technology and other industry). It shows that 118 listed 
firms (around 1/3 of the total) belong to high-tech group while 188 companies (about 2/3 of the 
total) are categorized into the firm group of low-tech.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Strategic alliance announcements by industry  
Industry groups Number of announcements Percentage of total 
High-technology & Medium-high-technology industries
4
 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 17 5.56 % 
Software & Computer Services 13 4.25 % 
Industrial Engineering 27 8.82 % 
Chemicals 12 3.92 % 
Aerospace & Defence 3 0.98 % 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 26 8.50 % 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 13 4.25 % 
Automobiles & Parts 7 2.29 % 
High-tech total 118 38.6 % 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4
 The high-tech verse low-tech classification is based on OESD’s classification scheme. For more detail please see 
appendix B. 
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Table continued 
Medium-low-technology & low-technology and other industry 
Media 23 7.52 % 
Personal Goods 4 1.31 % 
Food Producers 14 4.58 % 
Household Goods & Home Construction 4 1.31 % 
Electricity 17 5.56 % 
Alternative Energy 7 2.29 % 
Construction & Materials 34 11.11 % 
Health Care Equipment & Services 3 0.98 % 
Travel & Leisure 4 1.31 % 
Real Estate Investment & Services 23 7.52 % 
Financial Services (Sector) 6 1.96 % 
Industrial Transportation 12 3.92 % 
General Industrials 3 0.98 % 
Support Services 7 2.29 % 
Leisure Goods 7 2.29 % 
Industrial Metals & Mining 8 2.61 % 
Banks 6 1.96 % 
General Retailers 3 0.98 % 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 1 0.33 % 
Food & Drug Retailers 2 0.65 % 
Low-tech total 188 61.4 % 
Total 306 100.00 % 
 
After analysing all the cooperative agreements of strategic alliance, I classify the sample 
announcements into different types by purpose based on both the classification in previous studies 
and Chinese circumstances. Chan et al. (1997) classify the announcements into 7 types (i.e., I 
Licensing, II Marketing or distribution, III Development or research, IV Technology transfer or 
systems integration, V Combination of II and III, VI Various combination of I – IV, VII Not 
specified). Cuéllar-Fernández et al. (2011) provide a more specified definition for Technology 
alliance (share technology and technology transfer) and Marketing alliance (distribution, cross 
selling and marketing / promotion). In this study, I categorize the announcements into 7 types: 
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Marketing alliance, Technology alliance, Marketing & technology alliance, Financing alliance, 
Policy alliance, Infrastructure investment alliance and other
5
. More specifically, Marketing alliance 
refers to distribution and marketing & promotion cooperation (e.g. agreement for the discounted 
price, distribution sharing, marketing information sharing, OEM agreement, priority position 
granted as a supplier, brand cooperation). Technology alliance includes technology transfer & 
sharing and research or development (e.g. product development, commissioned development 
contract, cooperative laboratory, technological consulting and system integration). Marketing & 
technology alliance is defined by the agreements which contain both clauses from Marketing and 
Technology alliance. Financing alliance is specifically defined as the alliance that the listed firms in 
non-financial industry reach cooperative agreements with commercial banks. Because of the 
indispensable role the governments play in the economic growth in China, Policy alliances are not 
infrequent among the Chinese listed firms. It is defined by the strategic alliance between the listed 
firm and governmental institution (mostly in provincial and county level). Finally, another unique 
type of strategic alliance, inter-firm collaboration based on infrastructure investment project, is 
taken into consideration. By reviewing the announcements published on the website of the Stock 
Exchange, I find it prevalent for some firms reaching strategic alliance agreements with their 
partners for large-scale projects lasting over years. Here, this type of alliance refers to the long-term 
infrastructure project with no less than three year building period (e.g. real estate investment, large 
resource & energy project). Table 3 below provides a summary for the seven alliance types: 
 
 
Table 3: Strategic alliance announcements by different alliance types 
Alliance type Number of announcements Percentage of total 
Marketing alliance 76 
24.92 % 
Technology alliance 51 
16.50 % 
Marketing & technology alliance 47 
15.21 % 
Financing alliance 42 
13.92 % 
Policy alliance 63 
20.39 % 
Alliance for infrastructure alliance 27 
8.41 % 
Other 2 
0.65 % 
Total 306 100.00% 
                                                             
5 The examples of each type of strategic alliance announcement are provided in appendix A. 
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5. Methodology 
Here I conduct an event study introduced by Craig MacKinlay (1997) to investigate how the stock 
price performance associated with the strategic alliance announcements in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The rationale of event study is to assess the difference 
between the actual stock return within the event period and the stock return in terms of the market 
model for a certain period before the event period. If the result is significant compared with zero 
indicating normal stock returns without the impact of announcements, it might be reasonable to 
reach the conclusion that the announcements of strategic alliance do have a certain effect upon the 
stock performance during the event period.  
5.1. Event study 
I employ the methods that similar to those showed in the study by Lee et al. (2013). First, the 
announcement day is defined as Day zero
6
, and the estimation window period for market model 
starts from Day      to Day    .The chosen 150 days are used to acquire ‘normal returns’ which 
are influenced by the announcements themselves. Then, the 41-Day event period, 20 days before 
the announcement date and 20 days after as well as the announced date, is defined as the event 
window. After that, the abnormal return can be calculated from the event window period (Day     
to Day    ) based on the prediction errors of the market model. The steps to calculate the 
abnormal return of sample announcements are as follows: 
According to 306 strategic alliance announcements from sample period, the daily stock prices from 
Day      to Day     are acquired via DataStream database. The daily stock returns can be 
calculated by the natural logarithm of daily stock price differences upon two consecutive trading 
days,  
      (
  
    
)             (1) 
where     denotes the daily actual return of individual firm    at Day   while   denotes the daily 
price for individual firms. 
 
                                                             
6
 There are few announcements published during weekend. Regarding to this case, I define the first Monday after the 
announcement weekend as day zero. 
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The following market model is used to acquire the coefficients of    and   .  
                         
where     denotes the daily actual return of firm   at time   while     denotes the market return at 
Day  .     is the error term. 
According to the market model, I can obtain the expected returns of individual firms within the 
event period using estimated  ̂  and  ̂  acquired from Equation (2). 
 (    )   ̂   ̂               
where   (    )  denotes the expected return of individual firm   at time   while     denotes the 
market return at day  .  ̂  and  ̂  are estimated figure obtained from market model in Equation (2). 
Therefore, the daily abnormal return    of individual firm   at time   can be then acquired as 
follows: 
          (    )        ̂   ̂              (4) 
The daily abnormal return for individual firm can be obtained From Equation (4). By considering 
the all 306 sample announcements, the average abnormal return can be acquired via calculating the 
arithmetic mean of the abnormal returns of all the individual firms within the sample period: 
     
 
 
∑       
 
   
         
Consequently, the significance for the average abnormal return of sample announcements can be 
tested via t-statistics: 
      
    
       
               
where         denotes the standard deviation over the estimation period between Day      to 
Day    . 
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Apart from average abnormal return, the accumulative abnormal return     is also introduced to 
investigate the stock price reaction by declaring strategic alliance announcements. It can be 
acquired by using the following formula: 
            ∑     
  
    
           
where    and    denote the initial and the end date of the considered window period, so that     
can be summed on a certain time basis for all the sample firms entering strategic alliances. 
Therefore the cumulative average abnormal returns             of individual firm   from date    
to date    can be acquired by summing up the average abnormal returns: 
            
 
 
∑            
 
   
          
where N denotes the total number of sample firms. Similar to the significance testing for average 
abnormal returns      , the significance for the cumulative average abnormal return of sample 
announcements can also be tested via t-statistics: 
        
           
        
√ 
              
where          denotes the standard deviation of cumulative average abnormal return over the 
estimation period between −220 days and −21 days. N denotes the number of defined event dates. 
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6. Empirical tests and results 
 
6.1. Event study findings 
The event study analysis starts by exploring the abnormal returns for the entire sample during the 
window period. Table 4 below describes the average daily abnormal returns, standard deviations 
and the percentage of positive abnormal returns during the 41-Day event period. The t-statistics 
presented in the last column are conducted to test if the abnormal returns showed a great 
significance from zero.  
From Panel A we can see that the greatest abnormal return occurs at the announcement date: 0.95% 
for average abnormal return, much higher than the rest, 57.84% of which are positive, with the 
highest t-value (5.005) reaching 1% level significance. This supports the Main Hypothesis 1a that 
the strategic alliances at the announcement day have a great positive abnormal return which can 
significantly yield the firm value. Although there are no abnormal returns on other dates before the 
announcement that are significantly positive, the significance levels increase obviously when the 
announcement date is approaching, especially for the two days before declaring the strategic 
alliances. However, the average abnormal returns show a significant downward trend over a couple 
of days after the announcement: only 41.83% of firms have positive abnormal returns with an 
average value of  0.15% three days later.  
As showed in Panel B, nine window periods are selected to measure the stock performance using 
cumulative abnormal returns. For the first four window periods, the event windows are equal 
quarterly partitioned in terms of time order, while the last four periods are defined around the 
announcement date. Among the four selected event window built on chronology, only the 10-Day 
window period prior to announcement date reaches the 5% significance level, the abnormal returns 
of the firms increase as the announced date approaching. As for the window periods surrounded by 
the announcement date, all the defined period present great significance at 1% level. The greatest 
significant level occurs from Day  1 to Day 0: The t-value reaches 4.953 and 56.86% 
announcements have positive abnormal returns. Such finding supports the Main Hypothesis 1b that 
for firms entering strategic alliances, the cumulative abnormal return for the window period 
between announcement day and one day before are greater than the cumulative abnormal return in 
other window periods, suggesting that there might be some pre-announcement information leakage 
before the announcement day. 
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Table 4: Abnormal returns for different selected event windows 
Window period 
(day) 
OLS market model (sample=306) 
AAR (%) Abn. Stand.   0 t-Value 
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
     0.07 % 0.019 46.73 %  1.004 
 10    0.04 % 0.023 44.44 %  0.150 
 3    0.04 % 0.024 43.79 %  0.083 
 2    0.18 % 0.026 51.63 %    1.268 
 1    0.21 % 0.025 47.71 %    1.434 
   0    0.95 % 0.034 57.84 %             
   1    0.09 % 0.031 44.77 %    0.109 
   2  0.05 % 0.026 45.75 %  0.399 
   3  0.15 % 0.025 41.83 %  1.148 
  10    0.11 % 0.024 48.37 %    1.166 
  20  0.04 % 0.022 44.44 %    0.155 
Panel B: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
 20 to 11    0.04 % 0.069 47.71 %    0.103 
 10 to 1    0.92 % 0.076 52.94 %            
     1  to 10  0.54 % 0.087 44.44 %  1.077 
   10  to 20  0.76 % 0.070 44.12 %         
   5 to +5    1.09 % 0.092 52.61 %            
   3 to +3    1.14 % 0.074 54.58 %             
   2 to +2    1.31 % 0.064 56.21 %             
   1 to +1    1.18 % 0.052 57.84 %             
   1 to 0    1.16 % 0.041 56.86 %             
 
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated by 
OLS market model.  
* represent 10% significance level 
** represent 5% significance level 
*** represent 1% significance level 
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Figure 3 describes the variation tendency of average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns from the selected window period: Day  20 to Day +20. There is a significant upward trend 
for the cumulative abnormal return from about ten days prior to the announcement date, indicating 
some inside information might be leaked to public before the announcement. The biggest 
fluctuation for the abnormal returns occurs between Day  1 to Day +1. Especially on Day 0, the 
average abnormal return sharply increases to about 1%, suggesting that announcements of the 
strategic alliances do have a positive impact on the firm value creation. After that, the returns 
receive a substantial call back for the next couple of days after the announcement. At last, the 
cumulative abnormal returns decrease to stabilize at around 0.5% but still higher on average than 
those in the time span prior to the event window.  
The result by OLS market model strongly supports the main hypotheses that there exists a 
significant positive abnormal return for the firm around the announcement date as well as a possible 
information leakage before the announcement. Such result is consistent with many findings (Chan 
et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998; Chiou and White, 2005; Lee et al. 2013). 
Figure 3: Abnormal returns for selected event period 
  
Figure 3 shows trends for daily average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal return by 
announcing the strategic alliances over the 41-Day window period 
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6.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
In this section, a linear OLS regression is employed to examine which factors have significant 
impact on the increment of firm value by declaring the strategic alliance announcements. The model 
of cross-sectional analysis in my study is conducted as follows: 
 
                                                       
                                                                 
                                                        
                                           
 
                                                        
                                                                 
                                                        
                                           
 
where       is the dependent variable of OLS market model describing the average abnormal 
return for firm   at the announcement date (Day 0) while       is the dependent variable of OLS 
market model for firm   to show the cumulative average abnormal return from one day before the 
announcement date to the announcement date (Day  1 to Day 0).  
Independent variables include four variables which can best describe the firms’ characteristics 
associated with strategic alliance activities and eleven dummy variables based on the characteristics 
of the strategic alliance announcements. First of all, I select Size as one of the most important 
control variables in the multilinear regression model which is described as the total asset of the 
individual firm in logarithm one year before the announcement year. It measures whether the size of 
sample firms can influence the firm value by declaring strategic alliance announcement (Ammann 
et al., 2011, Lee et al., 2011). The second control variable, ratio of Price to Book Value (PVBV) of 
assets before the announcement year is used to value the Growth Opportunity (Chan et al., 1997, 
Cuéllar-Fernández et al., 2011).  The third control variable is designed to measure the Profitability 
of sample firms. Following the studies of Amici et al. (2012), I use Return on Equity (ROE) to 
control the extent of the stock price reaction to the sample firms with different level of capabilities 
for profits making. In addition, the impact of firms’ listing ages, the number of years passed since 
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the date of the IPO of firms to the date of the alliance announcements, is designed as a control 
variable (Cuéllar-Fernández. et al., 2011) as well. 
The variable, Dummy_Policy, which takes 1 for alliances with local governments and 0 otherwise, 
is specially designed to test the value effect of the firms due to the political-purpose strategic 
alliance. Dummy_International takes 1 for the alliance with firms from overseas (including firms in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan) and 0 otherwise
7
. This is conducted to investigate whether the firms with 
international background have a larger value increment than domestic ones. Dummy_Financing 
takes 1 for the firms cooperated with commercial banks for loan support and 0 otherwise. This is 
designed to measure the stock price impact upon the alliances with the financing purpose. The 
variable, Dummy_High-tech which takes 1 for the firms belonging to high-tech industry and 0 
otherwise, is included to examine how these corporations involved in alliance affect the increment 
of firm value. Finally, I focus on the yearly dummy variables. The six yearly dummies from 2007 to 
2012 based on annual distribution of sample announcements are conducted to examine impact of 
economy cycle upon the wealth effect of listed firms.  
Table 6 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression for both      and         . Both 
regression for      and regression for          indicate that the Size variable has significant 
negative coefficients:        ) at 5% level and        )  at 1% level, suggesting that firm size 
has an inverse relationship with abnormal return both on the announcement date and on one day 
before the announcement date. This finding supports the Hypothesis 7 that there exists a negative 
correlation between the firm size and their abnormal returns. It is consistent with many existing 
literature (Chan et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998; Chiou and White, 2005; and Lee et al., 2013). No 
regressions of the two indicate significant coefficients for the variable of Price to Book Value 
(PTBV), rejecting Hypothesis 8. This finding indicates that any potential opportunities for the future 
growth of listed firms are not significantly related to value change for the firms involved in alliance 
activities. Such conclusion is in line with that of Lee et al. (2013), indicating no significant 
relationship between the growth opportunity and wealth effect as well. As for the firm profitability, 
both the regressions have similar negative coefficients,         , for the control variable of ROE, 
but they are not significant at any level. This finding is consistent with that by Amici et al. (2012).  
Similar with the situation of ROE, another control variable, the number of years passed since the 
date of IPO, also shows an inverse relationship between the Age and value increment for both      
and         , but they are insignificant as well. 
                                                             
7 According to Chinese Law, firms based on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao are regarded as foreign corporations.  
  
 
38 
 
Table 5: Description of variables used in the cross-sectional analysis 
Variable name Variable definitions 
Firm Size 
(Asset) 
Total asset of listed firms in logarithm one year before the 
announcement year. 
Growth opportunity  
(PTBV) 
The ratio of Price to Book Value (PVBV) of listed firms one year 
before the announcement year. 
Profitability  
(ROE) 
The ratio of Return to equity (ROE) of listed firms one year before 
the announcement year. 
Firm Age  
(Year) 
The number of years passed of listed firms from the date of IPO to 
the announced date of strategic alliance. 
            
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is a local government 
partner involving in the alliance, 0 otherwise. 
                         
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a private firm aligning with 
a state-owned partner, 0 otherwise. 
                   
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is a foreign partner 
involving in the alliance, 0 otherwise. 
               
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the alliance is between a 
firm and commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
               
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm entering strategic 
alliance in high-tech industry, 0 otherwise. 
          
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategic alliance is 
announced in 2012, 0 otherwise. 
          
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategic alliance is 
announced in 2011, 0 otherwise. 
          
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategic alliance is 
announced in 2010, 0 otherwise. 
          
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategic alliance is 
announced in 2009, 0 otherwise. 
          
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategic alliance is 
announced in 2008, 0 otherwise. 
          
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategic alliance is 
announced in 2007, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6: Results for cross-sectional OlS regressions 
Variables Regression for abnormal returns upon OLS market model 
Regression for      Regression for          
Constant 
        
                
       
               
Firm size 
       
          
       
              
Growth opportunity 
       
           
       
           
Profitability 
       
           
       
             
Firm age 
       
           
       
(        
            
   0.011 
             
     0.020 
                 
                          
       0.002 
                    
                   
       
                
     0.001 
               
               
    0.001 
                
       
             
               
            
               
            
              
             Yearly dummy variables are included 
R-squared 0.1145 0.1622 
F-value                 
Observations                       306                       306 
Table 6 indicates the result of cross-sectional OLS regression for      and         .       
denotes the average abnormal return for firm   on the announcement date (Day 0) while          
denotes the cumulative average abnormal return from one day before the announcement date to the 
announcement date (Day  1 to Day 0). 
* represent 10% significance level 
** represent 5% significance level 
*** represent 1% significance level 
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The Dummy_Policy, the policy dummy which refers to firms cooperating with government, has 
highly significant positive coefficient (0.011 for      and 0.020 for           ) which indicates 
that policy alliance announcements contribute to the firm value increment more than that by other 
types of announcements
8
. Such finding strongly supports Hypothesis 2a that abnormal returns 
attributable to strategic alliance announcements with local government are greater than abnormal 
returns attributable to other alliances. But in the case of Dummy_financing, alliance with 
commercial banks, and Dummy_internaitonal, alliance with foreign firms, the two regressions show 
insignificant coefficients for the two control variables, suggesting that strategic alliance for 
financing purpose and the alliance with foreign enterprises have no significant effect upon the firm 
value change. Such results favour neither Hypothesis 3 nor Hypothesis 4. Dummy_High-tech, 
another dummy variable, refers to the firms entering the alliances that belong to high-tech industry. 
It shows non-significant negative coefficients,        for      and        for          
respectively, rejecting Hypothesis 5. Such result is across to the findings by Grant and Baden-Fuller 
(2004), who come up with a knowledge-based theory for the strategic alliance indicating that due to 
the lack of sources, technology alliances are much more vital than other alliances in intr-firm 
collaboration.  
                                                             
8 Further analysis for the policy announcement and value creation can be found in the following chapter.  
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Table 7: The correlation matrix for the variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
     1.0000                
Size -0.1922 1.0000               
Growth 0.0460 -0.3572 1.0000              
Profit -0.0684 0.2900 0.0307 1.0000             
Age -0.1126 0.2753 -0.0055 -0.0018 1.0000            
D_Pol. 0.1090 0.1058 -0.0806 -0.0200 0.1304 1.0000           
D_Pri. 0.0508 -0.2324 0.0707 -0.0370 -0.2178 0.0609 1.0000          
D_Int. -0.0586 0.0730 0.0987 0.0111 0.2257 -0.1561 -0.2426 1.0000         
D_Fin. 0.0261 -0.1665 0.1147 -0.0168 -0.0624 -0.2059 -0.0025 -0.1613 1.0000        
D_Hig. -0.0381 -0.2469 0.0977 -0.0271 -0.2158 -0.0779 0.0643 -0.1064 0.0412 1.0000       
D_2012 0.1764 -0.1030 -0.1631 0.1078 -0.0242 0.0733 0.1217 -0.0415 -0.0482 -0.0577 1.0000      
D_2011 0.0195 -0.1395 0.0957 -0.0059 -0.1572 -0.0273 0.1593 -0.0446 -0.0031 0.0411 -0.3891 1.0000     
D_2010 0.1207 0.1869 -0.0361 -0.0082 0.0832 0.1053 -0.1550 0.0116 -0.0635 0.0780 -0.3776 -0.2618 1.0000    
D_2009 -0.1752 0.0890 -0.0165 -0.0267 0.1265 -0.0857 -0.0671 0.1445 -0.0520 -0.1064 -0.2988 -0.2071 -0.2011 1.0000   
D_2008 0.0108 0.0223 0.0172 0.3143 0.0200 -0.0782 -0.1362 -0.0466 0.2131 0.0346 -0.1701 -0.1179 -0.1144 -0.0906 1.0000  
D_2007 0.0713 -0.0210 0.2864 -0.0064 -0.0278 -0.1029 -0.0449 -0.0317 0.1121 0.0446 -0.1514 -0.1049 -0.1018 -0.0806 -0.0459 1.0000 
This table describes correlation for all the variables in the multivariable linear regression analysing the average abnormal return on the 
announced date. 
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In order to check the multicollinearity among all the variables used in the regression model, a 
correlation matrix is provided on table 7. It can be seen that all pairs of variables show relatively 
low coefficient values, indicating low correlations across the variables used in the cross-sectional 
analysis.  
6.3. Value impact upon different subgroups of announcement sample 
According to the analysis under the OLS market model, I find significant differences for the 
abnormal returns among different types of strategic alliance announcements. In order to have 
further understanding for value creation by different characteristics of strategic alliances, I 
categorize them into six subgroups according to some unique characteristics of the strategic alliance 
announcements associated with the hypotheses.  After that, the t-value tests for both average 
abnormal returns on Day 0 and cumulative abnormal returns for Day  1 and Day 0 are conducted 
to assess their different abnormal return performances. 
Compared with the abnormal returns for the total sample announcement, those in the subgroup for 
policy alliance announcement are much higher than the average level of alliance announcements 
(1.60% for the      and 2.40% for         ), suggesting more positive performance expectations 
for the policy alliance by Chinese investors. This supports hypothesis 2 that firms entering policy 
alliance have more abnormal returns than the firms entering other alliances. There is not so much 
changed between the abnormal returns whether the firms choose to collaborate with domestic 
partners or foreign ones. This result is not consistent with the finding by Lee et al. (2013) which 
shows that the abnormal return for the alliance with overseas partners is higher than that with 
marital partners in Korea. This suggests even in developing countries the factors concerning certain 
alliance types have different impact on firm value creation. Some factors like legal constraint or 
cultural difference might lower investors’ expectations for such alliance. The most noteworthy 
difference in abnormal returns occurs in the alliances with financing purpose. Table 8 presents clear 
evidence that the abnormal returns of private firms entering financing alliances are significantly 
higher than the abnormal returns of state-owned enterprises. Especially for the event period from 
Day  1 to Day 0, the cumulative average abnormal return of state-owned enterprises even presents 
a negative coefficient for financing strategic alliance. Such results reject Hypothesis 3a that firms 
with financing alliance have greater abnormal returns but support Hypothesis 3b that the financing 
announcements with private firms involved are significant favourable news to Chinese investors 
since it is much more difficult for private firms to obtain loans from state-owned commercial banks.  
  
 
43 
 
 Figure 4: Abnormal returns for different subgroups of stratecgi alliances 
 
     denotes for the average abnormal returns on the announcement day (Day 0) while          
denotes the cumulative average abnormal returns from one day before the announcement to the 
announcement date (Day  1 to Day 0). 
 
6.3.1. Further analysis for policy alliance 
Table 8 shows the abnormal returns and their significant levels for each partitioned subgroup. Firms 
entering alliance seeking policy support have the highest abnormal return (1.60% of the abnormal 
return on the announcement day and 2.40% of the cumulative abnormal return for the 
announcement date and one day before the announcement). This finding indicates that the market 
has a great positive reaction to the announcements for firms involving strategic alliances with local 
governments. Based on this, some further research is employed in order to unveil the intrinsic 
reasons for the high abnormal returns by declaring policy strategic alliances. 
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Table 8: The abnormal returns for subgroups (different strategic alliance types) 
 Total Policy Inter. Domestic High-tech Low-tech Financing 
(State-owned) 
Financing  
(Private) 
Panel A. The AARs of each subgroup and its significance level 
     0.96 % 1.60 % 0.89 % 0.95 % 0.74 % 1.11 % 0.25 % 1.02% 
Stan. 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.033 0.031 0.035 0.024 0.024 
t-value                   1.585                            0.671          
Obs. 306 63 45 263 120 186 30 12 
         
Panel B. The CARs of each subgroup and its significance level 
        1.16 % 2.40 % 1.24 % 1.14 % 1.08 % 1,22 % -0.22 % 1.43% 
Stan. 0.041 0.048 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.040 0.033 0.027 
t-value                                                      -0.422          
Obs. 306 63 45 263 120 186 30 12 
Table 8 describes the average abnormal returns for different types of strategic alliances on the announcement date.  
* represent 10% significance level 
** represent 5% significance level 
*** represent 1% significance level 
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Figure 5: Description for the structure of Chinese governments 
 
This figure shows the structure for the categorization of policy alliances by the governmental 
characteristics.  
 
 
Here I divided the governmental partners into two groups: functional governments and hierarchical 
ones. Hierarchy governments are defined as the governments which are in overall charge of a 
certain region. The hierarchy group can be further categorized into three subgroups due to their 
governmental administrative ranking: Province, City and County or below (there is no firm 
cooperating with the central government of China). For instance, People’s government of 
Guangdong (a province in China) belongs to provincial group
9. People’s government of Shantou (a 
city in Guangdong) is in the second level. People’s government of Nanao, a county in Shantou, is 
included in the third ranking, county level and below
10
. The functional governments refer to the 
governments or the social entities with government background that are responsible to a specific 
field led by a people’s government (e.g. Committee for State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, Committee for Innovative Technology District, Department for 
Cultural Affairs). 
                                                             
9 The municipalities directly ranking under the central government, such as Beijing or Shanghai, have the equal 
administrative ranking as Provinces do, so they are categorized into province level to.  
10
 According to Chinese administrative ranking, some cities are named ‘city’ but actually they are county-level city. In 
such cases, these cities are categorized into the subgroup -- county level or below. 
Functional 
Government 
People's Government 
Provincial level 
People's Government 
 City level 
People's Government 
County level or below 
Hierarchy Function  
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It is believed that the main incentive for the firms collaborating with government is to acquire 
fundamental sources controlled by the government (Li et al. 2008). Such valuable sources can take 
a large variety of forms, such as preferential treatment by governments or the enterprises under their 
control, taxation deduction or relaxed regulation (Faccio 2006). These benefits are especially 
important for the infrastructure investment in China because apart from the above mentioned 
resources, Chinese local governments also have the power of land distribution. Consequently, I 
further divide the sample firms with policy announcements into two subgroups: one for the firms in 
infrastructure-related industry
11
 and the other one for the firms in other industry
12
.  
Table 9 describes the detailed categorization for policy alliances according to different 
administrative rankings of partnering governments and industry belongings for listed firms. Panel A 
shows the average abnormal returns for the alliances with both Functional Government partners and 
People’s Government partners on the announcement day. It indicates that the average abnormal 
return for functional government is 1.26% at the announcement date, which is much lower than that 
for the hierarchy ones (1.75%). Such result suggests that functional governments have a weaker 
effect upon the increment of firm value compared with hierarchical governments do. Furthermore, 
there also exist significant differences for the abnormal returns within hierarchical government 
group for governmental partners with different administrative rankings. The higher one government 
is indexed in Chinese administrative ranking, the higher abnormal return its partnering firm can 
achieve. (3.00% for provincial level, 1.90% for city level and only 1.25% for county level or below). 
This finding support Hypothesis 2b that within the Hierarchy Government group, the governmental 
administrative rankings have a positive correlation with the value increase for the firms, indicating 
that the power of the local government plays a vital role in increasing the partnering firm’s wealth 
effect.  
Panel B compares the abnormal return results by considering whether the sample firms belong to 
infrastructure-related industry or not. It shows that for the firms in infrastructure-related industry, 
their abnormal returns are higher than those are not. Such result supports Hypothesis 2c that the 
firms aligning with governments for infrastructure investment purpose have more value creation 
than the firms entering governmental alliance with additional reasons.  
                                                             
11 Infrastructure related industry refers to Real Estate Investment & Services, Construction & materials, Industrial 
engineering, Industrial Transportation, Travel & Leisure, Electricity and Alternative Energy. 
12
 Other industry refers to Food producers, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Software & Computer Services, 
Technology, Hardware & Equipment, Electronic & Electrical Equipment and Automobiles & Parts. 
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Table 9: Sub-categorization for policy alliances 
Panel A 
Functional  
Government  
partners 
Hierarchy 
Government 
Partners 
Policy Alliance 
by 
characteristics 
    =1.26% 
t-value =       
Obs. =19 
    =1.75% 
t-value =         
Obs. =44 
a. Province level 
     =3.00% 
Obs. =5 
b. City level 
     =1.90% 
Obs. =20 
c. County level  
     =1.25% 
Obs. =19 
Panel B 
Firms in infrastructure-related 
industry 
Firms in other industry 
Policy Alliance 
by industry 
     =1.72% 
t-value =         
Obs. =37 
     =1.43% 
t-value =        
Obs. =26 
* represent 10% significance level 
** represent 5% significance level 
*** represent 1% significance level 
 
6.3.2. Role of private firms in strategic alliances   
From previous chapters, we know that Chinese private firms always suffer from unfair competitions 
with state-owned enterprises. As state-owned enterprises controlled most of key resources, it is 
worth to test whether the abnormal returns for private firms are significantly greater than the rest. 
First, from the perspective of different ownership-holdings structures, all the alliances related to 
governments and foreign partnering firms are excluded from this sub-sample group. Then the 
strategic alliances left are categorised into four partitioned groups: strategic alliances between two 
state-owned enterprises; strategic alliances between two private partnering firms; a private firm 
reaches an alliance with a state-owned partner and a state-owned firm choose a private company as 
the strategic partner. 
Figure 6 below shows the different proportion of each type of strategic alliance categorising by 
different partnering firms’ ownership characteristics. The most prevalent type of strategic alliance is 
the alliances between state-owned enterprises, accounting for almost half of total sub-group alliance 
announcements. Around 1/3 of the alliances are made up by the private firms with the state-owned 
ones. Strategic alliance between private companies accounts for about 13% of the total alliance 
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sample, and the type that the state-owned enterprises seeking alliance with private partners is the 
most infrequent one, only accounting for less than 10% of the announcement sample.  
Figure 6: Proportion of strategic alliance by different ownership-holidng structures 
 
 
Table 9 shows the acquired abnormal returns from the four types of strategic alliances with different 
ownership holding combinations. Generally speaking, the Alliance for private firms seeking state-
owned enterprises has higher abnormal return (1.15%) than the average level of the abnormal return 
for other three types (0.87%). Such result supports hypothesis 6 that abnormal returns for private 
firms with state-owned cooperative partners are greater than the rest three types, which suggest such 
alliances are very good news to investors, since the private firms might share the advantages owned 
by state-owned enterprises through the strategic alliance relationship.  
Finally, I change an angle by employing a further comparable analysis for the abnormal returns of 
the rest three types of strategic alliance (State/State, Private/Private and State/Private). Abnormal 
returns for ‘Private with Private’ are also very high (1.18%), even higher than those for ‘Private 
with State’, probably because of some intrinsic advantages of private firms (e.g. operative 
efficiency or technological-intensity). Compared with the abnormal returns for ‘Private with Private’ 
alliances, those for ‘State-owned with State-owned’ are much lower. Such result implies a lower 
market reaction from Chinese investors possible due to the low operative efficiency of state-owned 
49 % 
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enterprises. The abnormal returns for ‘state-owned firms collaborating with private ones’ are lowest, 
suggesting a significant poor position for private firms as partnering firms with state-owned ones in 
the strategic alliances. Furthermore, only 12 observations under this type also strongly emphases 
that there are not so many state-owned governments willing to cooperate with private firms. 
 
Table 10: Sub-categorization for alliances with different ownership-holding structures 
Private firms with 
state-owned firms 
The other three types 
    =1.15% 
t-value =         
Obs. =85 
    =0.87% 
t-value =         
Obs. =173 
a. Private firms with private 
firms 
     =1.18% 
Obs. =35 
b. State-owned firms with 
state-owned firms 
     =0.87% 
Obs. =126 
c. State-owned firms with 
private firms 
     = 0.10% 
Obs. =12 
* represent 10% significance level 
** represent 5% significance level 
*** represent 1% significance level 
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Table 11: Summary for the hypotheses and test results 
Panel A: Main hypotheses test 
Announcement 
impact on firm 
performance 
H.1a: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns attributable to 
alliance announcements on the announcement date are significantly positive. 
Support 
H.1b: For firms entering strategic alliances, cumulative abnormal returns 
attributable to alliance announcements on the announcement date and one day 
before are higher than the abnormal returns on the announcement date. 
Support 
Panel B: Alliance-specific hypotheses test 
Policy alliance 
H.2a: Abnormal returns attributable to strategic alliance announcements with 
local governments are greater than abnormal returns attributable to other 
alliances. 
Support 
H.2b: The higher one government is indexed in Chinese administrative ranking, 
the higher abnormal return its partnering firm can achieve 
Support 
H.2c: For firms entering policy strategic alliances, abnormal returns to industry 
related firms are higher than abnormal returns to non-industry related ones 
Support 
Financing 
alliance 
H.3a: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns attributable to 
financing alliances are greater than abnormal returns attributable to other 
alliances. 
Reject 
H.3b: For firms entering financing strategic alliances, abnormal returns to 
private enterprises are greater than abnormal returns to state-owned enterprises.  
Support 
International 
alliance 
H.4: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns to the firms with 
foreign partners are greater than those abnormal returns to the firms with 
domestic ones.   
Reject 
Panel C: Firm-specific hypotheses test 
High-tech 
firms 
H.5: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns to high-tech 
enterprises are greater than abnormal returns to low-tech enterprises.  
Reject 
Private with 
State-owned 
H.6: For firms entering strategic alliances, abnormal returns to private firms 
with state-owned cooperative partners are greater than the rest. 
Support 
Firm size 
H.7: The size of firms entering strategic alliances is negatively correlated with 
abnormal returns attributable to alliance announcements. 
Support 
Growth 
opportunity 
H.8: The growth opportunity of firms entering strategic alliances is positively 
correlated with abnormal returns attributable to alliance announcements. 
Reject 
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7. Conclusion  
This study provides evidence concerning the impact of strategic alliance announcement on the value 
creation for partnering firms. I find significant abnormal returns of listed firms from the formation 
of strategic alliances at the announcement date, but there exist some inside information leakages 
before the announcement date.  
By employing a cross-sectional analysis, I further analysis which factors mainly explain the firm 
value creation in China. The specific findings can be summarized as follows: First, I find that firms 
entering policy alliance with governmental partners have the highest abnormal returns. Particularly, 
the higher one government is indexed in Chinese administrative ranking, the higher abnormal return 
its partnering firm can obtain. As for firm performance within the subgroup of financing alliance, 
abnormal returns of private firms are significantly higher than those of state-owned enterprises. 
However, there are no differences for abnormal returns between international alliances and 
domestic ones.  
From the perspective of different ownership-holding structures, the study shows evidence that 
abnormal returns for private firms collaborating with state-owned firms are higher than those in 
other alliance types. Furthermore, unlike the case of firms involved in strategic alliances in 
advanced countries, alliances announced by low-tech partnering firms lead the value of Chinese 
firms to rise more than that of high-tech firms. Finally, similar to the conclusions of previous 
studies, there also exists an inverse relationship between firm size and value increase, but the firm 
value increment does not have any significant impact upon the growth opportunity of individual 
firms.  
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9. Appendixes 
Appendix A: Examples of strategic alliance 
Strategic alliance for technology 
(Company Code: 002514; Company Name: Shenzhen Baoxin Tech; Alliance Partner: Beijing 
Fuweihao Tech; Announcement No.: 2012-046) 
The announcement of strategic alliance with Beijing Fuweihao Tech 
The board director of Shenzhen Baoxin Tech has approved the strategic alliance agreement with 
Beijing Fuweihao Tech in the 16th board conference.  
Shenzhen Baoxin Tech and Beijing Fuweihao Tech will start comprehensive cooperation on(C/C-Si) 
composite materials and brake rotors to promote the competence and cultivate the new growth point. 
In order to promote the mutual development and build a long-term mutual-beneficial relationship, 
the two parties reached the agreement in terms of the principles of equality, voluntariness, fairness, 
honesty and trust. The main contents are as follows: 
1. Shenzhen Baoxin Tech will sign a commissioned contract with Beijing Fuweihao Tech for 
the (C/C-SiC) composite materials and brake rotors development. In order to make the 
alliance more efficient, the two parties will deepen the collaboration by sharing technology 
platform, cultivating new research team and transferring technological achievement they 
already have.  
2. The specific type, requirement, format of (C/C-SiC) composite materials and brake rotors 
are determined by the goal of product application and general arrangement of project, which 
will be decided later. 
3. The principles and approaches of strategic alliance are as follows (which might be modified 
during the application process):   
1) Forming strategic alliance is the main approach of cooperation. Concerning Beijing 
Fuweihao Tech as the experiment platform, the two partnering firms will combine 
their unique advantages to develop new types of brake rotors product. It will 
accelerate the pace of knowledge transfer from research & development phase to 
production phase.  
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2) Shenzhen Baoxin Tech will be in charge of laying down the product type and 
technology requirement while Beijing Fuweihao Tech will be in charge of sample 
production, calculation and other relative experiment. Shenzhen Baoxin Tech should 
finance the R&D and own the patent of the final product.  
3) Both partnering firms should make every effort they can to offer convenience for the 
product development, including sharing laboratories and relative instruments as well 
as simulation software.  
4) Shenzhen Baoxin Tech has the priority to acquire other technology achievements 
made by Beijing Fuweihao Tech.  
5) Beijing Fuweihao Tech agrees to share all relative resources (e.g. technology, 
marketing information and human resources) to Shenzhen Baoxin Tech, assisting 
Shenzhen Baoxin Tech with the technology integration and staff training. 
6) All the technology achievements by mutual development are regarded as confidential 
information and should not be disclosed to a third party. 
7) The coordinators of two partnering firms need to contact with each other to track the 
progress of collaboration.  
8) The strategic alliance is valid for 5 years starting from the sign date.  
 
Shenzhen Baoxin Tech 
12.11.2012 
Strategic alliance for marketing 
(Company Code: 000829; Company Name: Shenzhen Chinatelling; Alliance Partner: Sang Fei 
Consumer Communications; Announcement No.: 2008-012) 
The announcement of strategic alliance with Sang Fei Consumer Communications 
Shenzhen Chinatelling Development, a subsidiary of Shenzhen Chinatelling, signed a strategic 
alliance with Sang Fei Consumer Communications on June 6
th
 2008 in Shenzhen. The main 
contents are as follows: 
1. The two partnering firms agree to build a long-term strategic alliance relationship. Shenzhen 
Chinatelling will provide support to promote the marketing share of Sang Fei Consumer 
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Communications in terms of its rich experience and dominant position in the Chinese 
mobile market; In return. Sang Fei Consumer Communications will provide qualified 
product according to Shenzhen Chinatelling’s requirement.  
2. The alliance between the two partnering firms includes the following fields (but not limit to) 
product distribution, marketing collaboration, tailored production, terminal promotion and 
retail website building.  
3. Short-term prospect of the strategic alliance: the amount of mobile phone sold in 2008 is 
expected to reach 600000 with the sales of no less than 600 million RMB.  
Shenzhen Chinatelling 
6.6.2008 
 
Strategic Alliance for both marketing and technology 
(Company Code: 002355; Company Name: Shandong Xingmin Wheel; Alliance Partner: Beiqi 
Foton Motor; Announcement No.: 2010-044) 
The announcement of strategic alliance with Beiqi Foton Motor 
Shandong Xingmin Wheel reached a strategic alliance agreement with Beiqi Foton Motor on 
December 20
th
 2010 in Beijing. The strategic alliance will deepen the collaboration for both 
partnering firms. The main clauses are as follows: 
1. Quality 
1) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should meet the piece part requirement by Beiqi Foton 
Motor and take action to improve the quality of product. 
2) The delivery inspection procedure of Shandong Xingmin Wheel should comply with 
national standards, industry standards, and the standards set by Beiqi Foton Motor. 
Shandong Xingmin Wheel also needs to maintain its industry-leading position for 
product quality. 
3) Shandong Xingmin Wheel will appoint technical specialists to support Beiqi Foton 
Motor for its technology improvement. 
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4) Upon the above clauses. Beiqi Foton Motor will grant the inspection exemption for 
Shandong Xingmin’s product. However. Shandong Xingmin must take the 
responsibility to guarantee its own product’s quality. 
2. Cost 
1) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should take actions to reduce product costs. 
2) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should show its financial transparency to Beiqi Foton 
Motor and take continuous inspection for the financial risk of Shandong Xingmin 
Wheel’s. The two partnering firms will mutually decide the pricing and reasonable 
profit space for the products of Shandong Xingmin Wheel. 
3) After setting the fundamental price for piece parts. Beiqi Foton Motor should take 
the charge of adjusting the product price according to the change of material price in 
terms of the related cost model.  
4) Beiqi Foton Motor promises to grant some preferential policy to Shandong Xingmin 
Wheel. 
3. Product development 
1) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should fulfil the new product development tasks 
appointed by Beiqi Foton Motor on time. 
2) Shandong Xingmin Wheel shouldcontinuously improve its product development 
capability via technology communication, collaboration and technical staff training.  
3) Beiqi Foton Motor has the priority to use the product or patent developed by 
Shandong Xingmin Wheel. 
4) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should introduce new test installation and build a national 
automobile test centre by 2012. Beiqi Foton Motor should recognise the test report 
by Shandong Xingmin Wheel. Meanwhile. Shandong Xingmin and Beiqi Foton 
Motor should share the test resources developed by the two parties. 
4. Orders 
1) Beiqi Foton Motor promises to not produce piece part products to other suppliers 
that have competitive relationships with Shandong Xingmin Wheel. Shandong 
Xingmin Wheel promises that Beiqi Foton Motor has the priority to obtain the piece 
part product from Shandong Xingmin Wheel. 
2) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should introduce the advanced order-guarantee-system to 
improve its supply chain management.  
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3) Beiqi Foton Motor should support Shandong Xingmin Wheel for its order-guarantee-
system application. 
4) Beiqi Foton Motor should guarantee Shandong Xingmin Wheel with no less than 70% 
product supply for certain types of vehicles (heavy truck, light truck, Europe V 
coach and agriculture vehicles). 
5. Information sharing 
Product information, technology information, quality information and service information 
should be shared by the two partnering firms.  Both parties have the confidential obligation 
to keep relative important information private.  
6. Globalization  
1) Beiqi Foton Motor should use the product provided by Shandong Xingmin Wheel as 
the priority and help it to penetrate into the global market. 
2) Shandong Xingmin Wheel should provide full support for Beiqi Foton Motor’s 
overseas marketing and after-sale services. 
3) Beiqi Foton Motor should assist Shandong Xingmin Wheel to accomplish the global 
production distribution, especially for international direct investment overseas. In 
return. Shandong Xingmin should utilise its existing overseas resource to support 
Beiqi Foton Motor’s globalization.  
 
Shandong Xingmin Wheel 
21.12.2010 
Strategic alliance for financing 
(Company Code: 600637; Company Name: Bestv New Media; Alliance Partner: Bank of China, 
Shanghai Branch; Announcement No.: 2012-007) 
The announcement of strategic alliance with Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) 
Bestv New Media and Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) signed a strategic alliance agreement on 
March 15
th
 2012 at Shanghai. In order to promote the mutual development and build a long-term 
mutual-beneficial relationship, the two partnering firms reached the agreement in terms of the 
principles of equality, voluntariness, fairness, honesty and trust. The main contents are as following: 
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1. The extent of the entity of the two parties: 
The collaboration parties include Bestv New Media as well as its subsidiaries which are 
holding limits or have the actual controlling power to the companies, and Bank of China 
(Shanghai Branch) as well as all its affiliated organizations. 
2. Alliance relationship: 
The two partnering firms should build a long-term collaboration relationship. Bank of China 
(Shanghai Branch) will treat Bestv New Media as one of the most important clients and 
offer full support to Bestv New Media’s business expansion, especially for the business 
fields related to financial services including commercial banking, investment banking and 
insurance. Bestv New Media should regard Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) as one of the 
most important business partners. Under the same condition, Bestv should offer preferential 
positioning to Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) as the main collaboration bank.  
3. Contents of strategic alliance 
The alliance is a comprehensive collaboration which covers credit service, financing service, 
capital market service, integration marketing service and large-scale activity cooperation. 
Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) should provide financing support to product development, 
marketing and other services (IPTV, mobile phone, Tablet Personal Computer, Internet 
Television and Smart TV) for Bestv New Media.  
Special clauses for the credit and financing service: First, according to governmental 
requirements, relative laws & regulations and articles of company, Bestv New Media should 
specify its specific credit limit based on its own business need to Bank of China (Shanghai 
Branch). Second, Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) will provide maximum 4 billion RMB 
credit support in terms of national policies and laws & regulation requirements. Third, the 
credit line should be based on the specific credit agreement: for each credit & financing 
business, Bestv New Media must strictly follow the financing approval procedures.  
 
Bestv New Media 
15.3.2012 
 
Strategic alliance with government 
(Company Code: 600561, Company Name: Jiangxi Changyun, Alliance Partner: Nancheng County 
Government, Announcement No.: 2012-046) 
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The announcement of intention of strategic alliance with Nancheng County Government 
Jiangxi Changyun and Nancheng County Government signed a letter of intent for strategic alliance 
on November 9
th
 2012. The main contents are as follows: 
1. The general description of alliance intention 
In order to seek the new growth engine for the county, Nancheng County Government  tends 
to combine its unique resources (Ecological District of Poyang Lake and Haixi Economical 
Zone), with brand and capital advantages of Jiangxi Changyun. Within the district of 
Nancheng County, Jiangxi Changyun plans to invest a project called “One Mountain, One 
River, One Park and One Station” in terms of the model of eco-efficient and low-carbon 
economy. The project is expected to reach a comprehensive promotion both for social effect 
and firm value. 
2. Cooperation approaches  
The main cooperation approaches include land leasing, circulation, acquisition and policy 
support to accomplish this comprehensive real estate project.  
More specifically: 
1) Nancheng County Government should take the charge of acquisition, remove and 
supplement of landing as well as all the other staff related to the infrastructure 
construction. At the same time, the county government also needs to support Jiangxi 
Changyun with the problems during the land handling, including indispensable 
resources such as water, electricity and telecommunication. 
2) As the project investor. Jiangxi Changyun should be in charge of the project 
planning, financing, and organizing the project development. In return, Jiangxi 
Changyun should have the majority of project profits as well. 
3. Cooperation scope  
The development project is mainly surrounded by the theme “One Mountain, One River, 
One Garden and One Station”. It intends to be divided into three sub-projects: 
1. “One Mountain, One River” Development Project 
“One Mountain, One River” Development Project refers to the development for 
scenic and historic area of Magu Mountain, development for the tourist project of 
Hongmen Reservoir and transfer & investment for the brand of Jiangxi Brewery. 
2. “One Park” Development Project 
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“One Park” Development Project refers to the development of the distribution area 
of Nancheng County. Jiangxi Changyun plans to invest a comprehensive modern 
distribution centre in Nancheng County. 
3. “One Station” Development Project 
“One Station” Development Project refers to build a tourist hub and a transportation 
station in the centre of Nancheng County.  
4. Period of Strategic alliance 
Both Nancheng and Jiangxi Changyun need to take their own responsibility and coordinate 
with each other about the time and procedure of the project development. The specific 
cooperation period will be decided after further negotiation.  
5. Land transfer and circulation 
Jiangxi Changyun acquires lands via land transfer and circulation. Further negotiation is 
needed for the specific scope and size of the land, and will be settled in a written agreement.   
By complying with the relative laws and policies, Nancheng County Government will offer 
the maximum discount for the tax that needs to be paid by Jiangxi Changyun.  
This letter of intent of the strategic alliance is just an intention for cooperation and the detail clauses 
still need to be discussed by the two parties. There are still some uncertainties upon the strategic 
alliance. The official agreement needs to be signed after revising by the board of directors or the 
general meeting of shareholders in terms of the Article of Association. According to the progress of 
the project, Jiangxi Changyun promises to disclose the relative information in time.  
Jiangxi Changyun 
9.11.2012 
Strategic alliance for infrastructure investment 
(Company Code: 002059, Company Name: Chaori Solar, Alliance Partner: Yunan Provincial 
Energy Investment Group, Announcement No.: 2012-044) 
The announcement of strategic alliance with Yunan Provincial Energy Investment Group 
The board of directors as well as all board members promises that there is no false and misleading 
statement or material misstatement in the announcement. According to the agreement, from 2012, 
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both partnering firms should accomplish 800 MV – 100 MV for photovoltaic plant construction in 
the next 5 years. The main contents are as follows: 
1. Model of collaboration 
The model of collaboration will be B – T (Build – Transfer), which means Chaori Solar 
should take charge for the construction and Yunan Provincial Energy Investment Group 
should be in charge of the plant running. 
2. Scale of collaboration 
According to the strategic plan, both partnering firms should accomplish 800 MV – 100 MV 
for photovoltaic plant construction in the next 5 years. More specifically, it is planned to 
build 100MW in 2012, 100 MV – 150 MW in 2013. The volume in 2014 is expected to 
reach 150 MV– 200 MV, while 200 MV– 250 MW and 250 MV– 300 MW for 2015 and 
2016 respectively.  
3. Rights and obligations for Yunan Provincial Energy Investment Group 
1) Yunan Provincial Energy Investment Group should be in charge of approving and 
initiating photovoltaic plant project. 
2) After accomplishing the construction, Yunan Provincial Energy Investment Group 
should be responsible for the repurchase of photovoltaic plants. In the meantime. 
Chaori Solar should retrieve the fund of construction. 
3) Yunan Provincial Energy Investment Group should take charge of coordinating with 
local governments during the project period. 
4. Rights and obligations for Chaori Solar 
1) Chaori Solar is responsible for design, purchase, construction and test run of 
photovoltaic plants in Yunnan province. 
2) Chaori Solar is responsible for the quality, security, price and construction period of 
the project.  
 
Chaori Solar 
26.4.2012 
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Appendix B 
 
OECD ISIC REV. 3 TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY DEFINITION
13
 
Classification of manufacturing industries into categories based on R&D intensities 
 
 High-technology industries  Medium-high-technology industries  
Aircraft and spacecraft  Electrical machinery and apparatus  
Pharmaceuticals  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  
Office. accounting and computing machinery  Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals  
Radio, TV and communications equipment  Railroad equipment and transport equipment.  
Medical, precision and optical instruments  Machinery and equipment  
Medium-low-technology industries  Low-technology industries  
Building and repairing of ships and boats  Manufacturing, Recycling  
Rubber and plastics products  Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing 
and publishing  
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel  
Food products. beverages and tobacco  
Other non-metallic mineral products  Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear  
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  
 
                                                             
13 http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf 
